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John Searle's Rationality in Action (2001) is an important 
new book on the theory of rational action. Searle's book is structured 
primarily as a critique of certain aspects of "the classical model" 
of rationality. In the introduction there are two sentences in which 
he acknowledges the classical model as "a pretty good model" of 
rationality; but this part goes by pretty fast, so if you missed it or if 
you skipped the introduction, you wouldn't think that there was 
very much he liked about classical rationality. Actually, he doesn't 
say much by way of characterization of the classical model, except 
that it is like chimp rationality1. We are, on this model, just very 
clever chimps, he asserts, except that we humans go in for more 
long range planning. 
Specifically, Searle takes issue with six claims that he attributes 
to classical rationality. The first is the claim that rational actions 
are caused by beliefs and desires, in a way that amounts to causal 
necessitation. Next is that rationality is a matter of obeying rules 
(i.e., principles). Third, that rationality is a separate cognitive faculty 
(rather, he claims that some of rationality" basic constraints derive 
from intentionality). Fourth, the claim that weakness (akrasia) of 
will can only arise where there is something wrong with the 
psychological antecedents of action. He further asserts that, on 
the classical view, there cannot be desire independent reasons for 
action; and finally, diat the set of basic or primary desires must be 
consistent in order for rationality to operate. He attacks some of 
these claims at much greater length than others, and these attacks 
largely constitute the book; but there is something close to a unifying 
theme. That is "the gap," which he alleges is key to conscious 
rationality, and is the basis of free will; and I will have most to say 
about that. 
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Searle says quite a bit about intentionality, which appears more 
basic than rationality; he links intentionality with directedness or 
aboutness—intentionality is always about something. Building on 
his earlier work, he makes much of the directions of fit and conditions 
of satisfaction that intentional states must have. An interesting 
observation is that the intentional structures of volition and cognition 
mirror each other—except for the gap of volition. Intentionality 
requires a pre intentional background of abilities and tendencies 
that humans share with other animals. Intentionality is itself 
necessary to rationality of action, which he claims is the basic type; 
theoretical rationality, though now highly developed in humans, 
appears as a special case of practical rationality. 
One extended argument regards so called desire independent 
reasons for action. Such reasons—obligations are his main 
example—he claims are unique to humans and derive from 
intentional conditions implicit in languages. Specifically, he argues 
that making commitments is inherent in speech acts of assertion 2. 
It seems to me that this depends on what is meant by 'commitment.' 
One might argue that true commitments presuppose customs of 
making promises, including promise keeping and expectations 
derived from such customary behavior, and that speech acts of 
assertion are necessary but not sufficient for commitments. 
Rationality is to some extent shared with other animals, it 
appears. We have the following definition. 
Rationality in action is that feature which enables 
organisms, with brains big and complex enough to 
have conscious selves, to coordinate their 
intentional contents, so as to produce better actions 
than would be produced by random behavior, 
instinct, tropism, or acting on impulse. (2001, p. 
141) 
So rationality is a goal directed activity, aiming at finding 'the best' 
or superior outcomes. Searle says this is possible only where there 
is free choice—in the libertarian sense. Other necessary ingredients 
include consciousness, desires, intentions, perceptions, a background 
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of (animal) abilities and tendencies, language to deliberate and to 
represent and evaluate relations; and also he includes logical ability. 
With all this, one has already a self, says Searle. 
Now to 'the gap.' Basically, by this Searle means that there is 
a lack of sufficient causal conditions to our decision making. 
Reasons could only be part of a causal explanation, he says; in 
those cases where reasons actually are sufficient, one would have 
no freedom—such an act would be compulsory, as though one 
were an addict 3. 
Somewhat surprisingly, Searle says that we do have 
experiences of 'the gap'—that we sense a lack of causally sufficient 
conditions when we have to decide. (Or is that just nervous 
apprehension?) This is the psychological experience of the gap 4 . 
Searle takes weakness of will as confirmation that the gap is 
real. Failure to take 'the gap' into account is what leads to the 
trouble in trying to explain akratic phenomena, he says. He attributes 
to the classical model the view that pure cases of akrasia never 
really occur; that one who acted akratically must not have had a 
true unconditional judgment (this view is associated with Donald 
Davidson), or some such denial of proper causal antecedents for 
action. Actually, akrasia is "as common as wine in France," Searle 
claims. It is a phenomenon of 'the gap'—which is always there, 
and there is thus no guarantee that we will always carry through 
with our resolutions or best decisions. 
Why do we deliberate and form intentions, anyway? Searle 
says that 
a large part of the point of these is to regulate our 
behavior.... we bring order into our lives and enable 
ourselves to satisfy more of our long range goals 
by the formation of prior intentions through 
deliberation. (2001, p. 234) 
Because of our inherent need to regulate our actions, we form 
intentional states, he says; and sometimes these can come into 
conflict. Akrasia is such a conflict between intentional states, he 
says, where "the wrong state wins." The outcome is irrational in 
that the agent doesn't act on his own best reasons. But there is, he 
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says, no necessary logical inconsistency in such cases, nor need 
one be overwhelmed by a strong desire. That's because of 'tine 
gap'—with the gap, anything can happen at any time. 
But what are we to make of 'tine gap,' and of its special 
causality? Searle is less certain here; he tentatively endorses what 
he calls a "unified field approach." This seems to mean that 
consciousness is not bottom up, but occurs on all levels 
simultaneously, and in addition consciousness itself seems to have 
a special causal power. It produces actions, through conscious 
rationality. He asserts that a self performs an act, but does not 
cause it. At the same time, he is completely opposed to the idea 
that the movement of the self as system could be random—that 
would not comport well with agency. 
With respect to causation and the gap, Searle says that it is not 
conceivable that neurobiological determinism could co occur with 
psychological indeterminism—that would mean that the conscious 
rational self was an epiphenomenon, which is very hard to accept, 
for one thing from an evolutionary point of view (since clearly 
nature has invested a lot in conscious rationality). 
Rather, it must be the case that causation is "systematic," but 
without causal sufficiency. The totality of micro elements is causally 
sufficient for the causation of mental states at any time (or else we 
would have dualism)—yet conscious rationality has influence "all 
the way down"; a top down causation with which Searle professes 
to see no problem. He claims that the gap is not between levels of 
organization, but is across time. At the end, he admits he does not 
find this explanation entirely satisfactory. It is, he says, an empirical 
matter. 
I don't find it satisfactory either; though I agree that the nature 
of neurobiological causation is an empirical matter. But his preferred 
explanation is not very clear, to say the least. If the micro level is 
causally sufficient for all states and phenomena, and the "unified 
conscious field" is at the same time separate and can causally 
influence future states, then how is this supposed to work? It sounds 
like overdetermination, though Searle would not agree. 
Even more dubious is his claim that we actually experience the 
lack of causal sufficiency in cases where one must decide. How 
could that be, since we don't experience its opposite? We don't 
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experience causal sufficiency, that causal conditions were such 
that exactly that event or action had to occur. Causal sufficiency is 
a theory based postulate, rather than something that is experienced. 
It is much more likely that what we experience is some sense of 
having now to decide; or perhaps a nervous anxiety associated 
with that. 
Also, other animals share in rationality and consciousness, he 
admits; do they also have such gaps? If not, what is the basis of 
human exceptionality? What would be the evolutionary basis for 
the disappearance of causal sufficiency, in mechanisms which 
prepare for action (where one would like to assure that superior 
choices will be made)? Finally, Searle says that rationality and the 
gap are coextensive—which is to say, that rationality is coextensive 
with a region of causal insufficiency. But if, as he allows, the gap 
may turn out to be an illusion, then what of rationality? It would 
then seem to have no extension; which surely cannot be right. 
However, apart from matters of 'the gap,' Searle's account is 
useful, with several good ideas and interesting suggestions and 
arguments. Searle connects rationality with intentionality in a way 
that is important and useful. He observes that rationality is a 
biological phenomenon, which we share with other animals. He 
offers a view of selves as non Humean, biological, unified beings— 
as animal agents; and reminds us that we need animal abilities to 
choose and act. He rightly links rationality to freedom (but then he 
uses the wrong concept of freedom, libertarian freedom, which 
does not go with his otherwise naturalistic account). He asserts 
that rationality in action is more fundamental than rationality of 
theory, the latter having a more recent and subsidiary development. 
Finally, his views on reasons, particularly his defense of external 
reasons, is enlightening and useful. Another strength is the general 
clarity of the writing. All in all, there is much to recommend in the 
book. 
Notes 
1. His example is the chimps of Wolfgang Kohler, who in a famous 
experiment, got down bananas by setting a box under them, standing on 
the box, and hitting the bananas with a stick. He seems to limit classical 
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rationality to means ends rationality. Actually, 'classical rationality' is 
something of a misnomer here, at least if by that one means a view derived 
from classical antiquity; 'the received view' or 'the standard view' might 
be more accurate. 
2. With respect to speech acts of assertion, he seems to have a point: 
saying that something is true does seem very close to saying "you ought 
to believe it." But as he notes elsewhere, on the volitional side, not 
everything runs parallel. There is, as he also says, nothing which stands 
to intention as truth does to belief. 
3. Searle has a libertarian view of freedom, that it is identical with free 
will which is taken to be an absence of sufficient causal conditions for 
action. This choice is not well argued for, and doesn't go well with his 
overall view that mind is a biological phenomenon. In my opinion, that 
leaves a gap in his account, between compulsion and uncaused choice. 
4. Actually, Searle claims that there are three such gaps; they are as 
follows. First, there is said to be a gap between deliberation and the 
decision reached—which is the same as the formation of a prior intention; 
second, there is another gap between the prior intention and the intention 
in action that is supposed to derive from it; and third (for actions extended 
in time) a gap between these intentions and the actual carrying out of the 
action. These seem to be theoretical rather than experienced, and depend 
on his theory of intentions. Also, the alleged feeling of 'tine gap' is 
experiential; whereas the gap implied by free will is metaphysical. 
